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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice Marshall deemed it important to find that Marbury had
an absolute right to his office. The importance is that an absolute right
had to be established in Marbury before there could be a controversy
before the court in which the constitutionality of a Congressional act
could be ascertained. Consequently this opinion holds that the finding
in Marbury v. Madison to the effect that an inferior officer could not
be removed by the President was germane to the issue of that case and
as such should be controlling in this case. The opinion also stresses
the holding of Shurtleff v. United States,3 which in effect is that Con-
gress may determine the conditions of removal of inferior officers
when it places the appointment of such officers in the hands of the
President. Considerable weight is laid to the fact that "if the framers
of the Constitution had intended the executive power in art. 2, par. I,
to include all power of an executive nature, they would not have added
the carefully defined grants of par. 2." This is to show that the in-
herent power of the executive is not all inclusive, and that by art. 2,
sec. 2, par. 2, his power is specifically limited as to inferior officers,
and that the President has only those powers which are conferred by
the Constitution itself. 4
The opinion of Justice Brandeis follows much along the lines of the
preceding opinion going more into detail as to specific instances of Con-
gress limiting the power of removal by legislative act. In conclusion
of his opinion, Justice Brandeis states that the excepting clause of art.
2, sec. 2, par. 2, limits the executive power of removal as to inferior
officers; and that all proposals to give the President uncontrollable
power to remove were rejected at the Constitutional Convention of
1787; "and protection of the individual, even if he be an official from
the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power was then believed to be
an essential of free government."
BENJAMIN W. Poss
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The Supreme Court, in a splendid fit of generosity, reviews as part of
its decision in State v. Levitan' the Wisconsin doctrine of classification
under the police power only to declare Sec. 99, 32 of the Wis. Stats.
invalid for indefiniteness in the use of the word "principally" as applied
to wholesale dealers who buy produce "for re-sale principally to others
than consumers," etc.2 In holding that it was proper for the legisla-
ture to distinguish between wholesalers and retailers of produce to re-
quire the former to be licensed the court reviewed that line of cases
which declare that the classification may be unwise from the popular
viewpoint; "it may be unscientific or illogical; . . . . it need not
be all-inclusive, or extend to all cases which it might legitimately in-
clude; but it must "apply equally to each member of a class."
'
3 189 U. S. 311.
it p. 58. Justice McReynolds quoting from a speech of Mr. Clay upon the powers
of the President.
'21o N. W. iii.
' Stat. 1925, Sec. 99.32 (I) (Laws 1925, c. 389).
'Kreuttzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 482, 204 N. W. 595, 603; State v. Evans,
130 Wis. 381, IiO N. W. 241; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209,
NOTES AND COMMENT
Inasmuch as the wholesaler (said the court) sells much of the prod-
uce by sample, and frequently never sees the consignment sold, the op-
portunities for fraud clearly distinguish his position from that of the
retailer whose established business gets its life from honest dealing and
personal contacts. The statute, insofar as it makes this distinction in an
endeavor to protect the public against fraud, was held not objectionable.-
Perhaps, when it used the word "principally" the Legislature had in
mind the decision in Borgnis v. Falk Co.,- which states that there may
be some on one side of the line whose situation is practically the same as
that of some on the other side, but there must be a distinction between
classes as classes, whether they are characteristics which persist in a
greater degree through the one class than in the other, which justify
legal discrimination between them. But when the Legislature provided
that violations of Sec. 99.32 should be deemed misdemeanors, it should
have made the persons to whom the section applied reasonably definite.
"Principal businegs" is a relative term; it might be the value of the
products consigned, or the gross amount of the sales, or the gross
profits or the net profits, or the number of articles handled. Since these
words involved a vital part of the statutory definition, they vitiated the
whole act.
The statute5 was also held invalid in that it limited an exemption of
local co-operative organizations to those composed of members residing
in the same county. As applied to organizations formed in cities which
are located in part in different counties, in each of which may..be mem-
bers, the attempted exemption is a denial of equal protection of the law.
If the organization were moved a few miles either way and the mem-
bership were to change with the change in locality the same organiza-
tion might be exempt. This is as much class legislation as would be
an exempting from the operation of a Horse License Act "All piebald
Indian ponies whose neigh is not a true E-flat monotone."
But the classification was held not improper because wholesale grain
dealers subject to the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Grain and Ware-
house Commissions are exempt from the license provisions of Sec.
99.32, although grain dealers not under that control would be subject to
the provisions of Sec. 99.32. This would appear to be an invalid class
within a class but the court held contra, not because of differences in
the nature of the work of the two classes of grain merchants but because
of a means of protecting the public other than licenses recognized by the
Legislature as differentiating the Superior Grain Merchants from the
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; Peterson v. Widide, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966,
52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778, Ann. Cas. io16 B, iO4O; Trading Stamp Cases, 166
Wis. 613, 166 N. W. 54, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 707; Pinkerton v Bench, 173 Wis. 433,
181 N. W. 125; Ladd v. Minneapolis, St. P. and S. S. M. R. Co., 142 Wis. 165,
125 N. W. 468; In re: Incovie Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135
N. W. 64, L. R. A. 1915 B 569, 616; Maercker v. City of Milwaukee, 151 Wis.
324, 139 N. W. 199, L. R. A. 1915 F 1196; Mehlos v. City of Milwaukee, 156
Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) OO9.
'Supra.
St. 1925, Sec. 99.32 (Law 1925, c. 389).
'St.' 1925, Secs. 126.O to 126.74.
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general run of wholesale produce dealers, i. e., the strict supervision of
the Grain and Warehouse Commission. Such sub-classification does not
raise a new question in Wisconsin. The exemption of "employees
working in shops and offices" from the operation of a law imposing
upon railway carriers liabilities peculiar to all their other employees
was held not so unreasonable a sub-classification as to be beyond the
power of the Legislature. "No court is justified in declaring classi-
fication baseless unless it can say without doubt that no one could rea-
sonably conclude that there is any substantial difference justifying dif-
ferent legislative treatment. Nor is classification to be condemned
... . because the situation of certain individuals in one class may
not differ materially from the situation of certain individuals in another
class. The class, must posses the distinguishing differences." The
shop and office employees, as a class, are "in less danger from the neg-
ligence of co-employees, and perform duties less directly connected
with the public safety than train employees and track repairers." This
constitutes a "substantial difference."
JAMES P. TAUGHER
